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ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE ARMENIAN
GENOCIDE AND THE FAILURE OF
OTTOMAN LEGAL REFORM
MARK L. MOVSESIAN*
I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to deliver some
remarks this morning. By way of background, I am not a historian or
genocide scholar, but a law professor with an interest in comparative law
and religion. Comparative law and religion is a relatively new field. It
explores how different legal regimes reflect, and influence, the relationships
that religious communities have with the state and with each other.1 My
recent work compares Islamic and Christian conceptions of law, a subject
that has engaged Muslims and Christians since their first encounters in the
seventh century.2
When I approach the Armenian Genocide as a scholar, then, I think in
terms of Ottoman law and the status of religious communities in that law.
These topics may not seem directly relevant at first, but they are. Changes
in the legal status of Ottoman Christians - including, of course, Armenians
- in the nineteenth century had a significant impact on the events of 1915.
The seeds of the Genocide were sown a generation earlier, in the Hamidian
massacres of the 1890s, in which hundreds of thousands of Armenians
died.' And the Hamidian massacres themselves were influenced by
dramatic changes in the classical Islamic legal system that had existed in the
Ottoman Empire for centuries. The Tanzimat, or "reorganization," granted
* Frederick A. Whitney Professor of Contract Law, St. John's University School of Law. I thank
Robin Charlow, Marc DeGirolami, Robert Delahunty, John McGinnis, and the participants in this
symposium for helpful comments. I thank Arundhati Satkalmi of the Rittenberg Law Library at
St. John's, and St. John's student George Tsiatis, for helpful research assistance.
1. For examples of recent scholarship in comparative law and religion, see RELIGION, LAW
AND TRADITION: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN RELIGIOUS LAW (Andrew Huxley ed. 2002); Harold
J. Berman, Comparative Law and Religion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
739 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman eds. 2006).
2. Mark L. Movsesian, Fiqh and Canons: Reflections on Islamic and Christian
Jurisprudence, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (symposium contribution).
3. See, e.g., Stephan Astourian, The Armenian Genocide: An Interpretation, 23 HIST. TcHR.
111, 125 (1990) (discussing death toll of Hamidian massacres).
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legal equality, in theory, for the first time to the Empire's Christian
subjects.' Legal equality, even in theory, subverted the classical Islamic
hierarchy and shocked Muslim opinion.5  In classical jurisprudence,
Christians had been dhimmis (in Turkish, zimmis), parties to a notional
contract, known as the dhimma, which granted them protection in exchange
for a promise to accept subordination.6 For Armenians to seek, or even
accept, legal equality was to repudiate the dhimma. This repudiation
caused deep resentment among Ottoman Muslims - so deep, in fact, that the
Tanzimat reforms were never fully implemented.7 The Tanizmat's failure,
and, in particular, the bitterness created by Armenians' attempt to assert
equality, forms a significant part of the background of the Hamidian
massacres and, ultimately, the Genocide itself.
I am dealing with emotional subjects this morning, and some
clarifications may be necessary. First, I am not arguing that efforts at legal
reform caused the Armenian Genocide. Like all major historical events, the
Genocide resulted from many factors-cultural, economic, military,
political, and religious. If one is to understand genocidal conflict, though,
one must appreciate the history of the relationship between perpetrator and
victim, and the Tanzimat-in fact, the classical Ottoman legal system
itself-is an important part of the history that Turks and Armenians shared.8
Second, I am not suggesting that Armenians and other Christians brought
their troubles on themselves by seeking equality. That would be to blame
the victims. Unless one believes that minorities must accept whatever
oppressive treatment the majority metes out, Armenians and other
Christians had a right to seek justice in Ottoman society.9
Third, I understand that the classical Sunni paradigm does not
constitute the whole of Islam. Some contemporary Muslim thinkers
critique the centrality of law in the classical model, which exists, with the
possible exception of Saudi Arabia, nowhere today.'" I do not mean to
4. See ERIK J. ZORCHER, TURKEY: A MODERN HISTORY 58-59 (1993); see also
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE 193 (2008) (translating
"Tanzimat").
5. See Roderic H. Davison, Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the
Nineteenth Century, 59 AM. HIST. REv. 844, 854-59 (1954).
6. See Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis, Introduction, in I CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1, 5 (Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis eds. 1982) [hereinafter CHRISTIANS
AND JEWS].
7. See, e.g., RONALD GRIGOR SUNY, ARMENIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 13 (1983).
8. Cf VAHAKN N. DADRIAN, WARRANT FOR GENOCIDE: KEY ELEMENTS OF TURKO-
ARMENIAN CONFLICT 3 (1999) ("[No analysis of the Armenian genocide can be adequate
without grasping the origin, elements, evolution, and escalation of the Turko-Armenian conflict.
In the final analysis the Armenian genocide is but a cataclysmic by-product of this... conflict.").
9. See SUNY, supra note 7, at 16.
10. For recent critiques of the classical model, see, for example, AN-NA'IM, supra note 4;
TARIQ RAMADAN, WESTERN MUSLIMS AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM (2004); Mohammad Fadel,
The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in
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suggest that classical Islam represents the religion's only expression or its
"true" essence. I simply describe what that model was, in the context of the
Ottoman Empire, and in doing so I rely on a standard account. Finally, in
short remarks like these, I must leave out many details. Even in outline,
though, an understanding of the Tanzimat, and the classical Islamic legal
regime it tried to replace, can illuminate the crisis that Ottoman Armenians
endured at the start of the twentieth century.
Before the Tanzimat, the Ottoman state generally conformed to the
classical model of Islamic government that had existed for centuries.
People sometimes characterize that model as a theocracy, but that is not,
strictly speaking, correct. In a theocracy, the clergy form the government,
and in classical Islam the clergy did not rule."l Nonetheless, the classical
state had a religious foundation and organized itself along religious lines.
In classical thought, the Muslim community, the umma, was both a spiritual
and political entity, the body of believers that lived, but also governed, by
God's law.' 2 The umma's supreme leader, the caliph, had ultimate
responsibility for ensuring that God's law was enforced.13
Muslims believe that God revealed His final law in the form of the
Quran, a series of recitations delivered to the Prophet Mohammed, and the
Sunna, the example of the Prophet's life.14 Together, these two sources
contain the Sharia (in Turkish, 5eriat), the divine law to which Muslims
must submit. 5 The Quran and the Sunna often express the Sharia in general
terms. During Islam's early centuries, though, in a process called ijtihad,
legal scholars - the ulama (in Turkish, ulema), or "learned" - deduced from
the Sharia complex bodies of jurisprudence, or fiqh, to guide daily life.'6
Over time, various schools of fiqh, known as madhabs, formed in the Sunni
world. 7 The Ottoman Empire favored one such school, the Hanafi madhab,
Islamic Law, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 5, 6-7 (2008). On Saudi Arabia, see NOAH
FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 10, 92-102 (2008); FRANK E. VOGEL,
ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA xiv (2000).
11. See MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM IN THE WORLD 142 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that "political
and religious institutions remained distinct" in classical Islam); KNUT VIKOR, BETWEEN GOD AND
THE SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 185 (2005) (discussing division of labor between state
and and religious scholars in classical Islam).
12. See HANS KONG, ISLAM: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 159 (John Bowden trans. 2007)
("The Islamic commonwealth is both a religious community and a political community."). For the
definition of umma, see F.E. PETERS, ISLAM: A GUIDE FOR JEWS AND CHRISTIANS 5 (2003).
13. See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 28; VIKOR, supra note 11, at 185.
14. VOGEL, supra note 10, at 3-4.
15. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI'AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 40-41 (2008).
16. See id. at 40-42. For the definitions of ulama and fiqh, see PETERS, supra note 12, at
174.
17. See DAVID WAINES, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 65-71 (2d ed. 2003).
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named for the scholar, Abu Hanifah, who founded it in the eighth century. 8
The scope of classical fiqh was comprehensive, covering both worship
(ibadat) and civil transactions (mu'amalat) - matters like contracts, torts,
marriage, and inheritance. 9 In principle, the development of fiqh ended in
the tenth century, with the so-called "'closing of the door of ijtihdd."'2
From that time on, the ulama were not to derive new rules, but "instead
study the established legal manuals and write their commentaries."'" Not
all the ulama agreed with this limitation; today, in particular, a number of
Muslim thinkers call for a new era of ijtihad to adapt fiqh to current
conditions.22 Still, the classical view held that fiqh had achieved perfection
in Islam's early centuries and that innovation, or bid'a, was prohibited.23
The caliph fulfilled his responsibility for enforcing Islamic law in
several ways, the most important of which was maintaining a system of fiqh
courts, staffed by judges known as qadis, whom the caliph chose from
among the ulama.24 Except when they received appointment as qadis, the
ulama remained outside the government;25 over time, a division of labor
between them and the official courts became routine.26 Faced with a
difficult legal dispute, a qadi would refer the matter to a member of the
ulama, known as a mufti, who would announce the relevant principle of fiqh
in an advisory opinion called afatwa (in Turkish, fetva).27 The qadi would
then determine how the fatwa applied to the facts of the case and issue a
judgment.28 Although a qadi did not have to follow a mufti's advice, in
practice qadis almost always complied.29
Fiqh was not the only law that existed in classical Islam. People
understood that practicalities might require a caliph to promulgate
regulations for situations that fiqh did not anticipate.3 ° Classical Islam
18. See id. at 66, 74.
19. See KAMALI, supra note 15, at 41-42.
20. Id. at 94.
21. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 84 (3d ed. 1998).
22. For example, the Hanbali madhab has never accepted the concept of the closing of the
door. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 490 (3d ed.
2003). For a call for a new era of ijtihad, see Ali Khan, The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The
Second Era ofljtihad, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 341 (2004).
23. See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 84.
24. See VIKOR, supra note 11, at 187; see also id. at 172 (noting that "qadds were always
considered prominent members of the 'ulamd").
25. See id. at 143 (discussing position of mufti); id. at 187 (distinguishing between qadis and
muftis).
26. See WAEL B. EALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 89 (2005)
("common practice").
27. See, e.g., VIKOR, supra note 11, at 8-9, 141; WAINES, supra note 17, at 86.
28. See VIKOR, supra note I1, at 8-9, 150; VOGEL, supra note 10, at 16-20 (contrasting roles
ofqadi and mufti).
29. HALLAQ, supra note 26, at 89.
30. See VOGEL, supra note 10, at 197; see also KAMALI, supra note 15, at 225 (explaining
that siyasa "is generally seen as an instrument of flexibility and pragmatism... designed to serve
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allowed the caliph to adopt such regulations as a matter of siyasa Sharia, or
Sharia "'policy."' 3  Over time, a parallel series of siyasa tribunals
developed alongside the fiqh courts.32 One should not see the siyasa courts
as an opposing legal system, however. As Knut Vikor explains, "[t]here
was no concept that 'the Shar'a is not valid here."' 33 In theory, siyasa
regulations were subservient to fiqh and could only complement it or fill in
its details; they could not contradict or override Sharia.34 On this
understanding, the ulama accepted siyasa regulations, viewing them "as a
necessary basis for the political authority that was a prerequisite to the
implementation of Shari'a."35
The Ottoman sultans, who claimed the office of caliph in the sixteenth
century,36 basically continued the classical legal system, with three
important innovations, all in the direction of greater centralization. First,
the sultans issued extensive compilations of siyasa regulations, which they
called kanuns, in areas like administrative, tax, and criminal law.37 The last
such compilation, the Kanunname-i cedit, appeared in the late seventeenth
century; it was still in force at the commencement of the nineteenth-century
reform movement.38 Second, the sultans combined the separate fiqh and
siyasa tribunals into a single court system administered by the qadis.3 9
Finally, the sultans incorporated the traditionally independent muftis into
the bureaucracy.4" High-ranking muftis became civil servants, appointed by
the government on the basis of public examinations.4 The chief mufti in
Istanbul, appointed by the sultan and superior to all the others, had the title
of shaykh al-islam (in Turkish, eyhiil-islam).4
Scholars have written volumes about classical Islamic law and
government, and I lack space to do these subjects justice. One aspect is
especially relevant here, however: the place of non-Muslims, and
the cause of justice and good government, especially when the rules of SharT'ah fall short of
addressing certain situations or developments.").
31. Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur'an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use of
Text, Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 67, 72
(2006). The word siyasa can also be translated as "'administration"' and .'management"'). Id.
32. See VIKOR, supra note 11, at 190.
33. Id.
34. See KAMALI, supra note 15, at 225; see also VIKOR, supra note 11, at 208 (discussing
Ottoman kanuns).
35. AN NA'IM, supra note 4, at 191 (discussing Ottoman kanuns).
36. PETERS, supra note 12, at 147. On the technical distinction between caliph and sultan,
see id. at 145-46.
37. See VIKOR, supra note 11, at 207.
38. Id. at 209.
39. Id. at 210; see also ANTONY BLACK, THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT
212 (2001).
40. See JONATHAN P. BERKEY, THE FORMATION OF ISLAM 264 (2003).
41. VIKOR, supra note 11, at 212.
42. Id. at 213.
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particularly Christians, in the Islamic state. Classical Islam distinguished
between pagans, who had no right of permanent residence, and so-called
"people of the book" (ahl al-kitab) - groups, like Christians and Jews, who
had been the recipients of earlier, though from the Muslim perspective
incomplete, revelation. 3 As people of the book, Christians could establish
permanent residence in Muslim society. Specifically, they could make a
notional contract with the umma - the contract was called a dhimma; the
non-Muslims who were parties were called dhimmis - whereby the umma
granted Christians protection in return for a promise to accept
subordination.'
The dhimma's evolution is not entirely understood. A Quranic verse
commands Muslims to fight the people of the book "until they pay" the
jizya (in Turkish, ciziye), a poll tax I will describe in a moment, and accept
a humbled status;45 some commentators also point to the so-called "Pact of
Umar," a purported seventh-century agreement between an early caliph and
the Christians of Syria, though most scholars believe the Pact to be a later
"invention."46  Some scholars maintain that the early caliphs adapted
Byzantine and Persian jurisdictional arrangements. Whatever the history,
the contours of the dhimma, and the status of the dhimmis, were
systematized as part of fiqh in the eighth and ninth centuries.48 In the
Ottoman era, dhimmis were further categorized into millets, or nations - the
Armenian Apostolic millet, the Greek Orthodox millet, the Jewish millet,
and so on. Supposedly, the millet system dated from the time of Mehmed
the Conqueror in the fifteenth century, though scholars believe it actually
developed later and was projected backwards in time.49
43. See ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 151-52 (4th ed. 2007). The
category eventually extended to groups like Zoroastrians and Hindus as well. WAINES, supra note
17, at 52.
44. See Braude & Lewis, supra note 6, at 5.
45. "Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not in Allah
nor the Last Day, and forbid not that which Allah hath forbidden by His messenger, and follow
not the religion of truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low." THE MEANING OF
THE GLORIOUS KORAN IX:29, at 195 (Marmaduke Pickthall trans. 1930). For a translation using
the phrases "People of the Book" and "Jizyah," see THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR'AN 9:29, at
445 ('Abdullah Ydsuf 'All trans.) (10th ed. 1999).
46. Robert Hoyland, Introduction: Muslims and Others, in MUSLIMS AND OTHERS IN EARLY
ISLAMIC SOCIETY xiii, xvi (Robert Hoyland ed. 2004) [hereinafter MUSLIMS AND OTHERS]; see
also C.E. Bosworth, The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam, in 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS, supra
note 6, at 37, 45-47.
47. See, e.g., Neophyte Edelby, The Legislative Autonomy of Christians in the Islamic World,
in MUSLIMS AND OTHERS, supra note 46, at 37, 43-44; Antoine Fattal, How DhimmTs Were
Judged in the Islamic World, in MUSLIMS AND OTHERS, supra note 46, at 83, 83.
48. Frangoise Micheau, Eastern Christianities (eleventh to fourteenth century): Copts.
Melkites, Nestorians and Jacobites, in 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 373, 380
(Michael Angold ed. 2006) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE HISTORY].
49. See Benjamin Braude, Foundation Myths of the Millet System, in I CHRISTIANS AND
JEWS, supra note 6, at 69, 73; see also BERKEY, supra note 40, at 266.
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As a formal matter, the dhimma was fairly clear. For its part, the umma
granted dhimmis the right to protection, property, some religious freedom,
and some communal autonomy.5" Millets could govern their internal
affairs, subject to general Ottoman oversight.5' In this regard, millet leaders
(millet-basis) had considerable prerogatives.52 For example, the Armenian
Patriarch of Constantinople, whose appointment required the Sultan's
confirmation, had authority over "his millet's spiritual administration and
officials, public instruction, and charitable and religious institutions."53 The
Patriarch even operated a prison for disciplining millet members, except in
cases "involving 'public security and crime."' 54 Millets also had a degree
of legal autonomy. Fiqh allowed dhimmi law to govern "matters of a
communal nature such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance."55 Communal
courts had jurisdiction of disputes about such matters between dhimmis,
though not disputes between dhimmis and Muslims.56
In return for these concessions, dhimmis theoretically agreed to pay a
heavy poll tax called the jizya - which the millet-basis collected on the
sultan's behalf - and to accept a second-class status.57 For example,
dhimmis had to wear identifying clothing, even in bathhouses. 8 They
could not serve in the military or hold high public office.5 9 They could not
"ride horses or carry arms."6 They could not build new places of worship,
but only repair existing ones, which could not be higher than mosques. 61
They could not attract attention during religious ceremonies.62 Although
Muslims could convert dhimmis, dhimmis could not attempt to convert
Muslims.63 (Fiqh made apostasy from Islam a capital offense, which would
have limited conversions in any event).' In general, dhimmis had to adopt
an attitude of quiescence and submission. As the Quranic verse suggests,
50. See Michaeu, supra note 48, at 380.
51. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 4, at 187.
52. See Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Millet System in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,
57 MUSLIM WORLD 212, 215 (1967) (noting that the Greek Patriarch had "the rank of a vizier and
... a guard of Janissaries to attend to him").
53. VARTAN ARTINIAN, TtE ARMENIAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM IN THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE 1839-1863: A STUDY OF ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 15 (1988).
54. Id.
55. Kemal (;iqek, Interpreters of the Court in the Ottoman Empire As Seen from the Sharia
Court Records of Cyprus, 9 ISLAMIC L. & Soc'Y 1, 2 (2001-2002). For an exhaustive discussion
of dhimmis' legal autonomy under classical fiqh, see Edelby, supra note 47, at 53-82.
56. See (iqek, supra note 55, at 1-2.
57. On the collection of taxes, see, for example, Abu Jaber, supra note 52, at 215-16.
58. Braude & Lewis, supra note 6, at 5-6.
59. AN-NA'IM, supra note 4, at 187.
60. Id.
61. Braude & Lewis, supra note 6, at 5.
62. Id. at 6; PETERS, supra note 12, at 195.
63. See BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 149 (1998).
64. See id.; Davison, supra note 5, at 845; see also MAYER, supra note 43, at 167 (discussing
"traditional notion that apostates are to be executed").
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humiliation was central to the dhimma, a fact both sides understood. 65 In
the Muslim conception, the dhimmis' social inferiority was the price for
obstinacy, for their stubborn refusal to acknowledge the superiority of the
revelation to Muhammad.66 Indeed, the harshness of the restrictions
undoubtedly served to create, from the Muslim perspective, a salutary
incentive for dhimmis to convert, as many did, over the course of
centuries.67
Inferiority pervaded the legal system as well. For example, in the qadi
courts, the testimony of a Christian was not admissible in any suit in which
a Muslim was a party. 68 The justification was straightforward: How could
one trust a person who had refused to accept Islam?69 "'[T]he word of a
dishonest Muslim,"' one Hanafi jurist explained, "'is more valuable than
that of an honest dhimm. '"'70 The opposite restriction did not exist,
however: Muslims could testify against non-Muslims.7
What about the autonomy granted millets? In practice, the concession
was not always so valuable. Millet-basis were "Ottoman official[s]," the
"instrument[s] and auxiliar[ies] of the Turkish bureaucracy."72 Because the
sultan had to confirm millet-basis, and because they customarily paid a
sizable sum on their appointment, corruption pervaded the selection process
and weakened morale.73 Although communal courts could decide actions
between millet members, they lacked enforcement authority.7 4 Moreover,
because qadi courts "often provided rights to Christians ... that were
unavailable in their own courts," particularly respecting marriage and
inheritance,75 many Christians chose to litigate intra-communal disputes in
65. See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 89 (1990)
(discussing jizya).
66. Cf Braude & Lewis, supra note 6, at 4 ("From the point of view of the Muslim,
unbelievers were people to whom the truth had been offered in the final and perfect form of God's
revelation, which they had willfully and foolishly refused.").
67. See PATRICIA CRONE, GOD'S RULE: GOVERNMENT AND ISLAM 372-73 (2004); cf
Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, The Great Church in captivity 1453-1586, in 5 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY,
supra note 48, at 169, 181 (discussing "attractions of conversion to Islam," including avoidance of
the jizya and other "humiliations ofdhimmi status").
68. Bosworth, supra note 46, at 49.
69. See id.
70. Id.; see also Fattal, supra note 47, at 98.
71. Bosworth, supra note 46, at 49.
72. See Aristeides Papadakis, The Historical Tradition of Church-State Relations under
Orthodoxy, in 1 EASTERN CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 37, 47
(Pedro Ramet ed. 1988) (discussing Greek patriarch).
73. See id. at 48; see also ARTINIAN, supra note 53, at 15-20 (discussing Armenian
Patriarchate); STEVEN RUNCIMAN, THE ORTHODOX CHURCHES AND THE SECULAR STATE 32-33
(1971) (discussing Greek Patriarchate).
74. See Najwa AI-Qattan, Dhiminmis in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious
Discrimination, 31 INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 429,429,433 (1999).
75. DONALD QUATAERT, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1700-1922, at 178 (2d ed. 2005); see also
AN-NA'IM, supra note 4, at 190.
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the qadi courts.76 Christian leaders worried that this exit option weakened
communal authority - the medieval Armenian monk Mkhitar Gosh
complained that the qadi courts were attracting many of his fellow
Christians, for example77 - and inveighed against it, but without much
success. In fact, as a Christian court could not adjudicate a dispute against
a Muslim, a Christian litigant with a losing case had a real incentive to
convert to Islam to avoid process; this was apparently not uncommon, even
for high-ranking clergy.78
Like any contract, the dhimma could be rendered invalid by non-
performance. Dhimmis could breach the contract, and forgo its protection,
by disregarding the restrictions it placed on them and affecting an air of
equality.79 In fact, most episodes of violence against dhimmi communities
were occasioned by a sense that dhimmis had become uppity, that they had
forgotten their place and grown insolent.8" Conspicuous displays of wealth,
for example, could be perceived as an insult to Islam; violent retribution
and plunder could easily follow.8 Persecution could also result from a
belief that dhimmis were cooperating with foreign interests, or from a
sultan's need for a target for popular unrest.82 Finally, persecution often
occurred during "periods of strict and militant Islam," which sought to
restore an "authentic" version of the faith.83
All this is not to say that life for dhimmis involved constant strife.
Their situation varied from time to time and place to place.84 Although the
umma always collected the jizya, it did not always enforce other dhimmi
restrictions, " and individual dhimmis could rise in Ottoman society and
even attain high office.86 At the time of the Tanzimat, for example, an
Armenian was director of the imperial mint.87 Muslims and dhimmis
interacted socially. They often lived in mixed neighborhoods and joined
the same guilds.88 In certain periods and places, dhimmi communities
found it possible to accumulate wealth and even favor from the sultan.
Armenians, in particular, "for a long time ... managed to establish a
symbiotic relationship" with Turkish Muslims; the Ottoman state referred to
76. See A1-Qattan, supra note 74, at 430; Cigek, supra note 56, at 2.
77. See THE LAWCODE (DATASTANAGIRK) OF MXIT'AR Go 52, 102 (Robert W. Thomson
trans. 2000).
78. See Bosworth, supra note 46, at 49.
79. See Braude & Lewis, supra note 6, at 9.
80. See id. at 6-7.
81. Id. at7.
82. Id. at 7-8.
83. Id. at 8.
84. See PETERS, supra note 12, at 195.
85. Braude & Lewis, supra note 6, at 6.
86. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 4, at 187.
87. RODERIC H. DAVISON, REFORM IN THE OT-rOMAN EMPIRE, 1856-1876, at 93 (1963).
88. See QUATAERT, supra note 75, at 179-81, 183.
No. 2]
10 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IV
Armenians as "'the loyal nation' (milleti sadka)."89  Periodically, though,
dhimmis suffered brutal repression, and a sense of inferiority and insecurity
always existed, even in the best of times.9" Indeed, as I have explained,
inferiority and insecurity were the essence of the arrangement.
Such were the outlines of relations between the umma and dhimmis
throughout most of Ottoman history. The Tanzimat dramatically altered
these relations, at least in theory. The word Tanzimat means
"reorganization,"'" and the reforms, initiated in 1839 with the Giilhane
Hatt-i $erifi - "'the Noble Edict of the Rose Garden,"' named for its place
of announcement - and continuing for roughly three-and-a-half decades,
sought to modernize the Empire and arrest its economic and military
decline.92 In part, the Tanzimat resulted from a genuine desire for reform
on the part of some Ottoman leaders - the Tanzimatqis, or "men of the
Tanzimat" - who understood that dramatic administrative, economic, and
social changes were necessary if the Empire were to survive.93 In part, the
Tanzimat resulted from outside pressure. European diplomats pushed the
Empire to adopt reforms that would improve the status of dhimmis, for
example.94 The Europeans had mixed motives for doing so: they desired
both to relieve the dhimmis' plight and, in addition, to identify client groups
that could serve as proxies for European influence within the Empire.95
The reforms addressed many aspects of Ottoman government: "the
army, the central bureaucracy, the provincial administration, taxation,
education, and communication."96 Importantly, for our purposes, they also
addressed law and the judicial system.97 The government adopted new
commercial and penal codes based on European models.98 It established
new secular courts.99 At first, these courts consisted of mixed tribunals -
89. Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Armenian Question and the Wartime Fate of the Armenians As
Documented By the Officials of the Ottoman Empire's World War I Allies: Germany and Austria-
Hungary, 34 INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 59, 61 (2002).
90. Cf Abu Jaber, supra note 52, at 216 (noting that dhimini "privileges were dependent on
the whims of the Sultan" and "could be withdrawn at any time").
91. AN-NA'IM, supra note 4, at 193.
92. See ZURCHER, supra note 4, at 52-53; see also DAVISON, supra note 87, at 5-6. Zuircher
dates the Tanzimat from 1839-1871. ZORCHER, supra note 4, at 58. Others date the period from
1839 to the adoption of the Ottoman Constitution in 1876. See Davison, supra note 5, at 848. In
any event, one can consider the Tanzimat period over when Sultan Abdul Hamid I1 suspended the
constitution in 1878. See infra text accompanying note 117.
93. DAVISON, supra note 87, at 5-6, 37; see also Davison, supra note 5, at 849-52.
94. See ZORCHER, supra note 4, at 58-59.
95. See id. (discussing European motives).
96. Id. at 59.
97. For an overview of the Tanzimat reforms, see id. at 58-69.
98. Id. at 64; see also Paul J. Magnarella, East Meets West: The Reception of West European
Law in the Ottoman Empire and the Modem Turkish Republic, 2 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 281, 284
(1993).
99. ZORCHER, supra note 4, at 64.
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containing European, Ottoman Muslim, and dhimmi representatives - that
heard commercial disputes between Ottoman and foreign traders.'00
Eventually, the government established a series of statutory, or nizamiye,
courts to "preside[] over civil and criminal cases involving Muslim and
non-Muslim."'' For the first time, non-Muslim witnesses were allowed to
testify against Muslims.'02 The Tanzimat also occasioned the drafting of the
famous Mecelle, a statute that codified aspects of Hanafi commercial fiqh
into positive law. 03 Notably, fiqh remained operative even under the
Mecelle; muftis and qadis "used the Mecelle as a basis for their verdicts,
but could supplement it with other evidence from their understanding of
classical Hanaft law whenever they found this necessary."'" Fiqh also
continued to govern family matters. °5
One aspect of the Tanzimat is especially important for us this morning.
The Tanzimat purported to grant dhimmis legal equality. °6 This principle
was proclaimed in the Hatt of 1839 and in a more comprehensive edict, the
Hatt-i Humayun, in 1856.107 I have already noted how the testimony of
non-Muslims became admissible in the newly-established nizamiye courts.
Equality also extended to education, civil service, taxation, and military
service. 8 Apostasy from Islam was no longer a capital offense. 09 The
1856 Hatt included a general anti-discrimination provision, "forbidding
'every distinction or designation tending to make any class whatever of the
subjects of [the] Empire inferior to any other class, on account of their
religion, language, or race.""' 0  Thus, as Ottomanist Roderic Davison
observed, "[e]ven name-calling was forbidden in the name of equality.""'
These were progressive reforms, welcomed by Ottoman liberals and by
many dhimmis, including Armenians (the millet-basis, who sensed that
legal equality would erode their official position, were not always so
enthusiastic)." 2  And yet, as contemporary observers recognized, the
100. See id; see also NIzAYI BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM tN TURKEY 161-
62(1964).
101. QUATAERT, supra note 75, at 178. For the translation of nizamiye as "statutory," see
BERKES, supra note 100, at 165.
102. See BERKES, supra note 100, at 162.
103. See V1KOR, supra note 11, at 230.
104. Id. at 231.
105. Idat 230.
106. See QUATAERT, supra note 75, at 178.
107. Davison, supra note 5, at 847.
108. Id.
109. ZORCHER, supra note 4, at 64.
110. Davison, supra note 5, at 847.
111. Id.
112. On the overall reaction of Armenians to the Tanzimat reforms, see DADRIAN, supra note
8, at 26. On the resistance of the millet-balis, see Abu Jaber, supra note 52, at 221; Davison,
supra note 5, at 854.
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reforms failed in their execution." 3 Particularly in the Anatolian provinces,
where most Armenians lived, the Tanzimat had little effect." 4 Armenians
and other Christians there remained subject to daily depredations and
indignities that the government did little to address, and the same social
inequalities continued. Here, again, is Davison, describing the situation:
Though by 1860 the condition of the Christians... had improved
considerably over what it had been only a few years before, they
could still complain legitimately about unequal treatment. They
still protested the general prohibition of bells on their churches, the
frequent rejection of their testimony in Turkish courts, occasional
rapes of Christian girls or forced conversions, and other sorts of
personal mistreatment. The Armenians of eastern Anatolia had
strong complaints about the marauding habits of armed Kurdish
bands. There were occasional fanatical outbursts against Christians
by local Muslim groups. There was still no equality in opportunity
to hold public office." 5
By the late 1870s, the Tanzimat had run its course. In 1876, the Empire
had adopted a constitution, modeled loosely on the Belgian, which
continued to proclaim equality for non-Muslims." 6 Less than two years
later, however, the new sultan, Abdul Hamid II, suspended the constitution
and prorogued the Ottoman parliament.' He ruled as an absolute monarch
for the next 30 years, until the Young Turk revolution overthrew him in
1908. 8 Under Abdul Hamid, an anti-Western, anti-secular reaction set
in." 9 Conservatives forced the dismissal of the committee responsible for
the Mecelle and prevented any further codification of mu 'amalat rules. 20
Faced with political, economic, and military chaos, Abdul Hamid "appealed
to Muslim solidarity" - to what was known as pan-Islamism - to cement his
authority.' 2' Indeed, an "outward religiosity" was the "most conspicuous
feature" of his reign. 22 "Perhaps in no other period of Turkish history,"
Niyazi Berkes writes, "was there ... so frequent use of the word eriat.'' 23
Secularization did not resume in earnest until after World War I, with the
113. See, e.g., DADRIAN, supra note 8, at 16-17 (discussing contemporary assessments of
British diplomats).
114. See Astourian, supra note 3, at 122-23.
115. DAVISON, supra note 87, at 115-16.
116. See ZORCHER, supra note 4, at 78; Davison, supra note 5, at 848.
117. See ZORCHER, supra note 4, at 80.
118. See FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 76-78.
119. See BERKES, supra note 100, at 261.
120. Id. at 172.
121. ZORCHER, supra note 4, at 83; see also BERKES, supra note 100, at 261-70 (discussing
"pan-Islamism" of Hamidian period).
122. BERKES, supra note 100, at 259.
123. Id.
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commencement of the Kemalist reforms. 124
Scholars offer several explanations for the Tanzimat's failure. Some
argue that the Ottoman government adopted the reforms only as a pretense
to placate European opinion and never really intended to effectuate them, 125
or that Turkish public opinion resented changes that had resulted from
foreign pressure.'26 Perhaps the reformist impulse simply was unequal to
the severe crisis of the 1870s. I would like to focus on a different
explanation, however, one that follows from what I have just said about the
pan-Islamism of Abdul Hamid's reign. The Tanzimat failed largely
because its proposal of equality for non-Muslims subverted the classical
Islamic structure that had existed for centuries. 27  Equality represented
bid'a - the innovation that was, in the classical mind, deeply suspect.' 2 In
Dadrian's words, the Tanzimat's "reforms were a repudiation of
fundamental socio-religious traditions deeply enmeshed in the Turkish
psyche, and institutionalized throughout the Empire."' 29 In short, equality
for non-Muslims sparked a religious backlash.3 °
Evidence of recalcitrance appears in contemporary sources. After the
Hatt of 1856, for example, Cevdet Papa, "a high government official and
acute observer of the Ottoman scene," noted that the edict's principle of
equality for dhimmis "'had a very adverse effect on the Muslims.'
131
"'Many,"' he wrote, "'began to grumble: "Today we have lost our sacred
national rights, won by the blood of our fathers and forefathers. At a time
when the Islamic millet was the ruling millet, it was deprived of this sacred
right. This is a day of weeping and mourning for the people of Islam."' .."
32
The edict's anti-defamation clause also caused much bitterness. One
popular complaint used the Turkish word for "infidel" - a word "with
emotional and quite uncomplimentary overtones"' 33 - to describe a world
turned upside down: "'Now we can't call a gdvur a gdvur.""34  Muslim
soldiers did not wish to serve under Christian officers.' 35 And Muslim
124. On the Kemalist reforms, see ZORCHER, supra note 4, at 180-81.
125. Davison, supra note 5, at 848-49 (discussing this explanation).
126. Id. at 857.
127. See DAVISON, supra note 87, at 79 ("The proposed reforms of the Tanzimat period...
represented a threat to the established order, to the Muslim way, and to the integrity and
cohesiveness of Turkish society.").
128. Nawaf A. Salam, The Emergence of Citizenship in Islamdom, 12 ARAB L.Q. 125, 140
(1997).
129. DADRIAN, supra note 8, at 20.
130. See BERKES, supra note 100, at 267 ("Pan-Islamic ideas were the culmination .. of a
reaction against the Tanzimat doctrine of fusing Muslims and non-Muslims into an Ottoman
nation.").
131. Braude & Lewis, supra note 6, at 30.
132. Id.
133. Davison, supra note 5, at 855.
134. Id. at 859; see also Abu Jaber, supra note 52, at 221-22 (discussing this saying).
135. See Davison, supra note 5, at 859.
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opinion would not accept the government's decree that Muslims and
Christians were now equally free to change religions. Apostasy from Islam
could still "easily" provoke "public fury."'36
For good illustrations of the resentment equality caused, one can
examine the retrospective assessments of some leaders of the Young Turk,
or Ittihadist, regime that eventually succeeded Abdul Hamid. 37  For
example, at a meeting in 1910, Mehmed Talit, the movement's "foremost
leader," explained why the Tanzimat had been bound to fail.'38 Like most
Ittihadists, Talt was not religious.'39 He understood the power that
classical Islam held in Ottoman society, though. A British diplomat reports
his words at the meeting:
You are aware that by the terms of the Constitution equality of
Mussulman and Ghiaur was affirmed but you one and all know and
feel that this is an unrealizable ideal. The Sheriat, our whole past
history and the sentiments of hundreds of thousands of Mussulmans
and even the sentiments of the Ghiaurs themselves .. . present an
impenetrable barrier to the establishment of real equality ....
There can therefore be no question of equality until we have
succeeded in our task of Ottomanizing the Empire. 4
Similarly, the Young Turks' "leading ideologue," Ziya Gtkalp, wrote an
essay, "'The Two Mistakes of Tanzimat,"' that expressed much the same
sentiment.14 ' Grkalp excoriated the edicts of 1839 and 1856 as "serious
mistakes," declaring that "'Islam mandates domination"'142 and asserting
that dhimmis would have to convert to Islam if they desired legal
equality. 143
In the classical Islamic worldview, then, legal equality for Christians
represented a major breach of the dhimma. The enormity of the
transgression was heightened by the fact that the dhimmis had sought the
support of European powers to achieve this equality. Throughout history,
recall, attempts by dhimmis to rise above their station and cooperate with
foreigners occasioned violent retribution; the Tanzimat fit the familiar
pattern.1" As early as 1856, one of the Tanzimat~is, Mustafa Redid,
worried about "the possibility of 'a great slaughter' ... in connection with
136. Id. at 860.
137. On the Young Turk movement, see ZORCHER, supra note 4, at 90-94.
138. Dadrian, supra note 89, at 62.
139. See VAHAKN N. DADRIAN, THE HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 5 (3d rev. ed.
1997) (discussing Ittihadist leadership).
140. Id. at 180 (editorial brackets omitted).
141. Id.; see also AN-NA'IM, supra note 4, at 195 (characterizing Gokalp as "the leading
ideologue of the Young Turks").
142. DADRIAN, supra note 139, at 180.
143. Dadrian, supra note 89, at 62.
144. See DADRIAN, supra note 139, at 147.
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efforts to establish equality through the enactment of public laws."'4 5 The
great slaughter came a generation later. Disappointed by the failure of the
Tanzimat to improve their bleak situation, particularly with respect to
oppression by local Kurds, some Armenians in Anatolia refused to pay the
customary taxes to Kurdish beys and began to organize in self-defense.
14 6
In response, Abdul Hamid sided with the Muslim Kurds.147 He ordered
large-scale massacres, carried out by Turkish regulars and Kurdish
volunteers known as the Hamidiye, which took the lives of one- to two-
hundred thousand Armenians between 1894 and 1896.148 Syrian Orthodox
Christians suffered greatly as well; approximately 25,000 of them lost their
lives, victims of the general anti-Christian violence in the region.'49
I cannot discuss the Hamidian massacres in depth here. I would like to
make two points about them, however. First, as the experience of Syrian
Christians confirms, the massacres had an unmistakable religious
component.' In the understanding of many Muslims, the dhimmis'
assertion of legal equality had constituted a betrayal of the religious and
social order that justified a violent state response. Here, for example, is the
report of another British diplomat, the Chief Dragoman, or interpreter, at
the British Embassy, who relied on information from local Muslim sources,
concerning a massacre of Armenians in Urfa in 1895:
[The perpetrators] are guided in their general action by the
prescriptions of the Sheri law. That law prescribes that if the
"rayah" [subject] Christian attempts, by having recourse to foreign
powers, to overstep the limits of privileges allowed to them [sic] by
their Mussulman masters, and free themselves from their bondage,
their lives and property are to be forfeited, and are at the mercy of
the Mussulmans. To the Turkish mind the Armenians had tried to
overstep those limits by appealing to foreign powers, especially
England. They, therefore, considered it their religious duty and a
righteous thing to destroy and seize the lives and property of the
Armenians .... "
These sentiments fit the official pan-Islamism of Abdul Hamid's era.
"While foreign observers and members of the Christian communities saw it
145. Id. For more on Redid, see id. at 33-34; DAVISON, supra note 87, at 37; ZORCHER,
supra note 4, at 364.
146. See RONALD GRIGOR SUNY, LOOKING TOWARD ARARAT: ARMENIA IN MODERN
HISTORY 105 (1993).
147. Id.
148. See id.; see also Astourian, supra note 3, at 124-25.
149. See Anthony O'Mahony, Syriac Christianity in the modern Middle East, in 5
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 511,512.
150. See DADRIAN, supra note 139, at 147-51 (discussing religious component of Hamidian
massacres).
151. Id. at 147.
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as an atavistic return to fanaticism," Erik Z-ircher writes, Abdul Hamid's
"appeal to Islam did strike a chord with Muslims inside and outside the
empire, who felt threatened by European imperialism and by the privileged
position of the Christians."'52
Second, the failure of the Tanzimat had an effect on Armenian
aspirations. Most Armenians, recall, had greeted the Tanzimat
enthusiastically. 53 After the Hamidian massacres, however, it was clear
that the Ottoman state was not prepared to grant real equality to them or
other Christians.'54 The large majority of Armenians - particularly in urban
centers, but in Anatolia as well - resigned themselves to the status quo,
deciding, no doubt, that prudence required them to accept their lot.15 A
small number, though, in frustration began to organize themselves into
revolutionary cells.' 56 The revolutionaries, who were "always a tiny
minority among Armenians," '157 occasioned increasingly brutal repression
by the government, which in turn provoked more resistance, a "cycle of
violence," Ronald Suny writes, that "produced more and more victims." '158
Suny describes how the cycle ended:
Finally, strategic considerations motivated the Turkish government
to end the perceived Armenian threat to their northeastern frontier.
During World War I, faced with the Russian Army, the Young
Turks decided to disarm, uproot, transport, and eliminate the
Armenians in eastern Anatolia. This policy was equivalent to the
murder of a people, to genocide, and at least 600,000 to 1,500,000
Armenians perished in the death marches, executions and battles of
1915.159
I will close by returning to Mustafa Redid, the Ottoman official who
worried that granting legal equality to non-Muslims might lead to a great
slaughter. 60 Despite being one of the Tanzimatgis, Redid seems to have had
serious doubts about the project. In a memorandum he wrote for the sultan
after adoption of the 1856 Hatt-i Humayun, Redid explained that, in the
152. ZORCHER, supra note 4, at 83.
153. See supra text accompanying note 112.
154. See SUNY, supra note 7, at 16.
155. See SUNY, supra note 146, at 105; see also QUATAERT, supra note 75, at 191 (noting that
"the overwhelming majority" of Armenians did not support calls for a separate state but
"continued to opt for the Ottoman system").
156. SUNY, supra note 7, at 16.
157. SUNY, supra note 146, at 105.
158. SuNY, supra note 7, at 16-17.
159. Id. at 17. The literature on the Armenian Genocide is voluminous and growing. For a
brief but excellent introduction to the events of the Genocide, see SUNY, supra note 146, at 106-
15.
160. See supra text accompanying note 145.
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public proclamation of the edict, it had been necessary to soft-pedal its true
aims.' 6' One had to avoid alarming Muslims, who could not be expected to
welcome the bid'a the Tanzimat represented.162 In the memorandum, Redid
questioned "whether a six-hundred-year-old empire could transform its
inner character into something 'entirely repugnant and contrary"' by means
of public law. 63 Another Tanzimat architect, Ali Papa, similarly tried to
explain to skeptics why the reforms seemed to lack effect. "'[B]ut in what
country in the world,"' he asked, "'ha[s] it been found practicable to efface
in a day the effects of the habits and traditions of ages by a simple change
of the law or in the disposition of the Government?"" '
Scholars disagree whether these remarks reflect duplicity or genuine
frustration. 165 Whether or not they sincerely desired equality for non-
Muslims, though, Redid and Ali were making a powerful point. As the
American legal historian Grant Gilmore famously remarked in another
context, law reflects, but does not determine, a society's values. 166 Law that
does not reflect the values of its society is bound to fail. If the conflict
between law and values is great, and touches a society's core beliefs,
significant disorder, including violence against vulnerable communities, can
easily occur. By granting dhimmis equality, the Tanzimat completely
altered the relationship that had existed between Muslims and non-Muslims
for centuries. In erasing the identity of Muslims as the ruling millet, it
opened a huge gulf between Ottoman law and Ottoman society's basic
values. In retrospect, its failure seems to have been inevitable. The failure
of the Tanzimat, and the violent reaction it occasioned, forms a major part
of the background to the massacres of the 1890s and the Genocide of 1915.
161. See DADRIAN, supra note 139, at 33.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Compare id. at 32-34 (arguing that Ottoman leaders were engaged in "double-talk"
meant to deceive European opinion), with Davison, supra note 5, at 848-53 (arguing that the
Tanzimat architects genuinely desired reform).
166. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110 (1977).
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